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A nuanced understanding of negotiation is essential to combating civil wars, 
transnational challenges to order, and threatening nonstate actors in the global political 
arena. This quantitative study goes beyond structural explanations and evaluations of 
negotiations as mere outcomes to explore the processes and factors that cause nonstate 
armed groups in civil wars to pursue negotiations sooner. With the use of data on all civil 
wars from 1946-2011, this study utilizes competing risks survival analysis to demonstrate 
the relative importance of cultural loyalty to the local population, governing ambitions in 
the area, and assistance from a third party in the timing of negotiation pursuit by rebel 
groups. The central findings suggest that, regardless of a nonstate armed group’s strength 
relative to the state, having an outside backer or the goal of defending a cultural identity 
is associated with earlier attempts at negotiation, while access to lootable resources 
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The well-known estimate of 16.2 million civil war deaths in the latter half of the 
20th century1 demonstrates clearly just how ruinous intrastate conflict is. Although not 
unique in their ability to annihilate, these internal conflicts are often not only destructive 
but also profoundly self-destructive. A willingness to accept tremendous losses within the 
polity for sometimes unclear gains is often accompanied by a viciousness and taboo-
breaking that permeates well beyond any designated battlefield.2 Fighters in recent civil 
conflicts frequently seem to embrace this mentality of self-destruction, exaggerating it 
with psychotropic substances and gleefully announcing to the world their irrational 
indifference to casualties.3 It is unsurprising that a world witnessing this phenomenon 
from Somalia to Srebrenica began to ask itself how these conflicts might end and whether 
there truly was a new type of war, a new type of combatant, or neither.  
                                                          
 
1 James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American 
Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75.  
 
2 Though highly visible and severe violence is a salient characteristic of contemporary 
civil wars, this is not to say the violence is without purpose or logic. See Stathis Kalyvas, The 
Logic of Violence in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
 
3 Yahya Sadowski, The Myth of Global Chaos (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution 




While the debate continues over just how new the so-called “new wars” are,4 one 
distinct trend suggests that something is different. While early studies found that 
negotiated ends to civil wars were rare and typically unstable,5 studies of recent conflicts 
show that an increasing proportion of intrastate wars are being negotiated and the success 
rate of these agreements is higher. A recent study found that of the 216 peace agreements 
signed between 1975 and 2011, the vast majority were in intrastate conflicts and 125 of 
these agreements successfully halted the fighting between signatories for at least five 
years.6 This suggests that questions about conflict termination remain important, and that 
research on contemporary war processes and participants must include negotiation. 
Negotiation as a form of political behavior by groups has been somewhat 
understudied in the civil war context. A tremendous amount of research has gone into 
looking at civil war duration and termination processes, but much of this literature treats 
negotiation as an outcome rather than a purposive political decision. Research is needed 
to expand our understanding of negotiation as a communicative process of meaningful, 
interrelated actions by political actors.  
An important area of inquiry in this vein is whether the characteristics of nonstate 
armed groups in civil war affect their tendency to pursue negotiation at various stages of 
                                                          
 
4 For an overview of this debate, see Mary Kaldor, “In Defense of New Wars,” Stability: 
International Journal of Security and Stability 2, no.1 (2013): 1-16.  
 
5 For a discussion of this, see Jeffery Dixon, “Emerging Consensus: Results from the 
Second Wave of Statistical Studies on Conflict Termination,” Civil Wars 11, no. 2 (2009): 121-
136. 
 
6 Stina Högbladh, “Peace Agreements 1975-2011 - Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement 
Dataset,” in States in Armed Conflict 2011, eds. Pettersson Therése and Lotta Themnér,  
(Uppsala: Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2011), 51. 
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the conflict. Will such groups which possess a salient cultural loyalty or ruling ambitions 
be more likely to negotiate earlier in the conflict? Do nonstate armed groups that receive 
outside assistance delay negotiation? Can organizational ideas overpower the pull of 
material processes in conflict decision making? In exploring these questions, this paper 
will also help contribute to our understanding of whether actor-level variables have 
explanatory power that reaches beyond what conflict-level variables can tell us about 
armed civil conflict.  
The following section will provide a brief overview of the literature on negotiated 
conflict termination broadly, as well as what is known about nonstate armed groups and 
negotiation in civil wars. The study will then present a competing risks survival analysis 
model that uses existing data to test the relative importance of actor-level characteristics 
in the duration of conflict prior to nonstate participant pursuit of negotiation. The major 
findings on the four main explanatory variables will be discussed and then the paper will 
conclude with a discussion of the contribution of this study, limitations of its findings, 









REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Introduction 
Conflict termination has been a perennially popular topic in the study of politics. 
With the shifting patterns and growing prevalence of intrastate war, termination has been 
no small part of the massive and growing literature on civil wars. As outright defeat of 
either side becomes an increasingly rare outcome in intrastate armed conflicts,7 there has 
been an increasing focus on alternative modes and mechanisms of conflict cessation.  
These topics have remained salient in the research due in part to the inarguably 
massive number of people affected by these conflicts. With recent transnational terrorism 
and mass migration flows, the world is becoming highly attuned to spillover effects that 
reach well outside of conflict zones. As policymakers try to design the best responses, 
conflict termination has been and remains an important area of focus. Indeed, one of the 
earliest quantitative studies of conflict conclusion patterns was government-
commissioned,8 and this high policy relevance doubtlessly helps put this issue area high 
on the agenda for academic research as well.  
                                                          
 
7 Cochrane Feargal, Ending Wars (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 32-35.  
 
8 Frank Klingberg, “Predicting the Termination of War: Battle Casualties and Population 




It is unsurprising that the research on civils wars and conflict termination is not 
only ongoing but also voluminous. Even within the categories of civil wars and their 
subcomponents, there is great diversity in the relevant issues, tactics, and actors.9 In 
addition to this variety, this issue area also has a high degree of complexity. There are 
many interrelated data generating processes to study and increasing amounts of collected 
data with which to do so. While early studies relied mostly on national measures to 
capture subnational processes, recent datasets are increasingly fine-grained and even 
georeferenced to small sublocalities.10  
This influx of collected data is coming at an important time for this area of 
inquiry. There is reason to believe that trends in conflict termination are undergoing a 
substantial shift. Early work assumed that negotiated ends to conflicts were rare and 
seldom effective, yet recent work shows that the majority of conflicts undergo 
negotiation and that this often successfully halts the conflict.11 The need to explain this 
change highlights the importance of studying contemporary conflict processes, trends 
across time, and the variation between conflict types.  
 
 
                                                          
 
9 While many tend to imagine guerilla-type insurgencies when they think of civil conflict, 
scholars have established a wide range of “technologies of rebellion” that account for diversity in 
these wars. See Stathis Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, “International System and Technologies of 
Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,” The American Political 
Science Review 104, no. 3 (2010): 415-429. 
 
10 Ralph Sunberg and Eric Malander, “Introducing the UCDP Georeferenced Event 
Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 4 (2013): 523-532.  
 
11 Madhav Joshi and J. Michael Quinn, “Is the Sum Greater than the Parts? Terms of 
Civil War Peace Agreements and the Commitment Problem Revisited,” Negotiation Journal 31, 
no. 3 (2015): 9. 
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Conflict Termination: The Civil War Focus 
Much of the earliest literature on this topic was dedicated to establishing a 
separate study of intrastate conflict. While many of the insights from the vast literature on 
interstate conflict negotiation are certainly significant across all types of conflicts, 
scholars have established that inter- and intrastate conflicts differ in many key 
dynamics.12 This underlines the importance of developing the intrastate conflict literature, 
as there is evidence of differing dynamics resulting from the nature of the parties, 
relationships between them, and the issues typically at stake in a civil war.  
 One of the major differences between interstate and intrastate wars that scholars 
have elaborated on is the fundamentally different nature of nonstate participants. Rebel 
groups do not rely upon maintaining territory for their existence and conflict success in 
the way that states do.13 Rebel groups have the option of going underground if needed, 
and this contributes to a dynamic of uncertainty where endurance often trumps relative 
strength.14 Furthermore, due to the nature of their objectives, rebel organizations typically 
have a strong incentive to be lean, which in turn may leave them lacking the capabilities 
and experience to negotiate as effectively as a state would.15 
                                                          
 
12 Phillip Hultquist, “Power Parity and Peace? The Role of Relative Power in Civil War 
Settlement,” Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 5 (2013): 623-624. 
 
13 Christopher Butler and Scott Gates, “Asymmetry, Parity, and (Civil) War: Can 
International Theories of Power help us Understand Civil War?” International Interactions 35, 
no. 3 (2009): 330–340. 
 
14 Hultquist, “Power Parity and Peace? The Role of Relative Power in Civil War 
Settlement,” 624. 
 
15 I. William Zartman, "The Diplomacy of Conflict Management," in Conflict 
Management in Divided Societies, eds. Christina Yakinthou and Stefan Wolff (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 95-96.  
7 
 
Civil war termination is also a useful separate study because, on top of the 
differing nature of the participants, civil conflict also adds relational uniqueness. The first 
major relational difference that is relevant to negotiation results from at least one side 
typically not recognizing the other as a legitimate political entity. Often the feeling is 
mutual. Mutual recognition of parties to a conflict is commonly seen as a vital basis for 
negotiation and, in contrast to most interstate conflicts, this is typically absent in civil 
war.16  
This lack of mutual recognition is often not only an issue at the outset, but also 
one that remains throughout the conflict. States have a strong incentive to provide zero 
recognition to rebel groups to avoid legitimating both their grievances and their chosen 
mode of resolving them. The power of this incentive has been demonstrated empirically 
in studies showing that the central government will usually hold off on recognizing a 
rebel organization until it is capable of posing a substantial and credible threat to the 
state.17  
This issue of nonrecognition is compounded by two other major differences in the 
relationship between the parties in intrastate conflict. One key issue is that the capabilities 
that matter for each participant are less comparable, due to the typically asymmetric 
nature of civil wars. This difficulty comparing relative power makes it harder for the 
parties to evaluate their chances of success, which in turn can push a party that would be 
                                                          
  
16 Navin Bapat, “Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes,” Journal of Peace 
Research 42, no. 6 (2005): 699-717. See also: Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and 
International Conflict,” Annual Review of Political Science 5, no. 1 (2002): 1-30; and James 
Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379-
414. 
 
17 Bapat, “Insurgency and the Opening of Peace Processes,” 699-717. 
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better off negotiating to continue fighting.18 Furthermore, in contrast to most interstate 
wars, there is not necessarily a unifying standard of success. While both parties in an 
interstate war generally share an understanding of what it means to win a war, how it is 
signified, and what precisely constitutes defeat, this shared understanding is typically 
absent from intrastate conflicts,19 particularly in the modern day.20  
Finally, scholars have demonstrated that civil wars merit separate study due to the 
different nature of the issues over which these wars are typically fought. In civil wars, 
actors’ goals are often incompatible and the stakes are indivisible. Furthermore, the 
struggle of the rebels is often existential. In modern interstate conflict, both parties can 
reasonably expect to survive the war. This is in stark contrast to intrastate conflicts, 
where both the rebels and the regime can usually anticipate that defeat would spell their 
total demise.21 Furthermore, with the exception of rare cases of partition, the parties to a 
civil conflict must learn to coexist in the same borders after the fighting ceases.22 These 
factors tremendously alter the basis of and opportunities for negotiation. 
The early research that established the need for separate study of intrastate wars 
and their termination laid many important theoretical foundations and articulated key 
                                                          
 
18 Hultquist, “Power Parity and Peace? The Role of Relative Power in Civil War 
Settlement,” 624. 
 
19 Paul Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), 29. 
 
20 Dominic Johnson, Failing to Win: Perceptions of Victory and Defeat in International 
Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).  
 
21 Zartman, "The Diplomacy of Conflict Management," 95.  
 
22 Bill Kissane, “Introduction,” in After Civil War: Division, Reconstruction, and 
Reconciliation in Contemporary Europe, ed. Bill Kissane (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2015), 2. 
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assumptions for this subset of the political science literature. With this understanding of 
the uniqueness of these conflicts, a large set of scholars set out to explain the vital 
questions relating to conflict termination in civil wars.  
 
Civil War Termination: Key Questions and Assumptions 
 The research into these questions is typically rooted in a rationalist understanding 
of armed conflict. While occasionally war is explained as a manifestation of an irrational 
violent streak in human nature or as a result of the powerful being able to totally displace 
costs in pursuit of greed or other gains, most scholars assume that wars are a result of 
actors that rationally pursue conflict actions which correspond with coherent preferences 
and objectives.23 This rationalist approach seems to be bolstered by empirical research 
suggesting that rebellion is not necessarily pursued where the grievances are most severe, 
but rather in the places with conditions that foster insurgency as an effective strategy.24 
This approach to conflict corresponds with an understanding of negotiation as resulting 
from a preference-based decision making calculus by primarily rational actors.25 
Explaining negotiation thus becomes a project of understanding the costs and net benefits 
that actors weigh in their decisions to pursue and ultimately desist in pursuing their goals 
through armed conflict.  
War is both very costly and a high-risk strategy.26 Scholars must explain what 
                                                          
 
23 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 379.  
 
24 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75-90. 
 
25 Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process, 8. 
 
26 Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” 379-414. 
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incentives drive the actors’ initial and continued choice of this option in resolving a 
conflict. Scholars have argued that there are key defensive incentives such as self-
preservation at play, but also offensive incentives such as ideological victory, spoils, and 
opportunities for corruption. 27 Scholars assuming a rationalist approach to conflict 
negotiation thus must work to demonstrate either a change of preferences or a change of 
strategic conditions, or both, when the negotiation option has been pursued.  
Scholars have formed a variety of approaches to this and used them to address key 
questions about the duration of the conflict until negotiated termination, the utility of 
third party mediation, and the stability of negotiated agreements. The literature 
explaining these has primarily studied and articulated explanations at the conflict level. 
This conflict-level termination research has developed into three primary branches, which 
are described in the following subsection.  
 
Primary Branches of Civil War Termination Theory: 
Contemporary Explanations at the Conflict Level 
Conflict Situation: Ripeness and Relative Power 
Many scholars have argued that the emergence of negotiation is best explained by 
the dynamics in the conflict situation shifting to a configuration that makes agreement 
possible. One of the earliest and most famous articulations of this suggests that conflicts 
will reach a stage where they are “ripe for resolution” because the warring parties have 
reached a “mutually hurting stalemate,” are cognizant of this fact, and now acknowledge 
                                                          
 
27 Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical 
and Quantitative Analysis,” The American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (2000): 780.  
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the existence of an alternative mechanism for addressing their dispute.28  
While it is important to note that stalemate is often a key explanatory variable, 
this does not suggest that scholars believe it is a simple variable with a uniform effect 
across the conflict. Scholars have shown that conflicts are not just a linear movement 
toward resolution, and that the conflict being at a stalemate can have different effects 
depending on the stage that the peace process is in. Scholars have established that 
stalemate may encourage parties to move into negotiations, but actually seems to hinder 
the ultimate implementation of peace agreements.29 
This need for more complex understanding of stalemate processes has led to 
detailed empirical examination of the effects of relative power. Scholars have shown for 
example that the presence of relatively weak rebel groups tends to lengthen the duration 
of conflict substantially. 30  Other studies have looked more closely at the effects of 
power parity at various stages of the conflict. One author has found that, in a feature 
somewhat unique to intrastate conflict, power parity tends to increase the likelihood of 
negotiated settlement.31  
 
                                                          
 
28 I. William Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” in International 
Conflict Resolution After the Cold War, eds. Paul Stern and Daniel Druckman (Washington: 
National Academy Press, 2000), 226-245; and I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution: Conflict 
and Intervention in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985).  
 
29 Michael Findley, “Bargaining and the Interdependent Stages of Conflict Resolution,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 5 (2013): 905-932. 
 
30 David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A Dyadic 
Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 4 (2009): 
570–597. 
 




Conflict Information: Commitment and Bargaining 
 The second major branch of the civil war termination literature explains the 
pursuit and success of negotiation foremost with information processes. While the 
relative strength of parties and overall conflict situation is important, these scholars 
typically focus on the role of commitment problems, uncertainty, and informational 
asymmetry.  
 One of the most well-known theories of conflict termination in this group is 
credible commitment theory. Considered by some to be the dominant approach to conflict 
termination,32 this theory developed by Barbara Walters suggests that the main obstacle 
that hinders conflict resolution is both parties struggling to make their commitment to 
settlement seem credible. This argument suggests the need to go beyond merely looking 
at the conflict situation or the issues over which the conflict was fought, to examine 
information and bargaining and see how credible commitments to peace can be made.33  
 A number of works have made arguments for how to facilitate credible 
commitment. The earliest articulation of this theory focused on the role of external, third-
party involvement in the conflict. The author argues that outside assistance becomes key 
to prevent the actors from being overwhelmed by the many incentives to cheat and renege 
on their agreement.34  
 Other scholars have picked up and modified this argument about third parties 
                                                          
 
32 Joshi and Quinn, “Is the Sum Greater than the Parts? Terms of Civil War Peace 
Agreements and the Commitment Problem Revisited,” 8.  
 
33 Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. 
 
34 Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. 
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and there is a rich literature that looks at when external parties do or do not act in this 
beneficial manner.35 While it is unlikely that anyone would argue that third-party 
intervention is always beneficial, many find it has empirically been overwhelmingly 
positive. Some have gone so far as to suggest that the recent increased success of 
resolving conflict is the result of third parties’ mediation efforts and role in underlining 
the credibility and legal standing of agreements.36 Although the findings are not 
necessarily uniform, major empirical studies have found evidence that international 
efforts such as peacekeeping are largely effective at rolling back civil conflict.37 
 Other scholars examining the credible commitment problem have looked to 
solutions beyond outside assistance. A growing body of work looks at the role of internal 
enforcement mechanisms such as monitoring in facilitating peace agreement formation 
and enforcement. Scholars have argued that these treaty mechanisms of internal 
enforcement are effective at reducing the uncertainty that exists in negotiation processes 
and even afterward.38 
Another subset of the conflict information branch of the literature looks at the role 
                                                          
 
35 For example, a major recent study looks at the role of selfishly motivated third-party 
interventions, and finds that these lengthen civil wars due the acting additional veto player, and 
the third party experiencing few costs. See David Cunningham, “Blocking Resolution: How 
External States can Prolong Civil Wars,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (2010): 115-127.  
 
36 Christine Bell, “Peace Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status,” American Journal 
of International Law 100, no. 2 (2006): 373-412. 
 
37 See Doyle and Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative 
Analysis,” 779-801; and Veronia Fornta, “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International 
Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War,” International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 2 
(2004): 269-292.  
 
38 Michaele Mattes and Burcu Savun, “Information, Agreement Design, and the 




of uncertainty, especially with a consideration of the number of parties in the conflict. 
Assuming that information processes are vital for conflict negotiation, adding multiple 
parties increases uncertainty, which may make rebels hesitant to commit to an agreement 
and unclear about when it would be strategic to do so. Empirical support has been found 
for the idea that multiple parties lead to longer civil wars by increasing uncertainty, 
reducing the number of acceptable agreements, and leading to shifting alliances that may 
incentivize a refusal to negotiate.39 
However, the evidence on this issue is not necessarily uniform. Although other 
scholars agree that there is an impact of having multiple parties, they have argued that the 
effect is different depending on which stage the conflict is in. For example, a recent study 
found that multiparty conflicts are more likely to move into negotiation processes, but 
that having multiple parties becomes a severe hindrance when it comes to the 
implementation of agreements.40 
 Another major subset of this literature looks at the role of information 
asymmetries in the duration and termination of war. This explanation is compatible with 
a number of other theories of conflict resolution, but these scholars tend to focus on the 
role of representation, misrepresentation, and the analysis of information by conflict 
parties.  
 War provides powerful incentives for participants to overstate their commitment 
and posture in a way that exaggerates their capabilities.41 Scholars have shown that 
                                                          
 
39 David Cunningham, “Veto Players and Civil War Duration,” American Journal of 
Political Science 50, no. 4 (2006): 875-892. 
 




misrepresentation stems not only from boastful exaggeration, but also from strictly 
practical considerations such as keeping the existence, size, and location of forces a 
secret.42 However, there has been quite a bit of debate over the extent to which this 
misrepresentation is possible and practical in a typical civil war, 43 thus casting some 
doubt upon the explanatory power of this argument.  
 Empirical studies have found substantial evidence that resultant information 
asymmetries exist and matter, especially in determining outcomes in later stages of 
conflicts. 44 Scholars have also found evidence that suggests that these can get in the way 
of reaching a settlement,45 and also possibly lead to the breakdown of peace.46 Further 
research is likely needed to shed more light on the nuances of this argument, but 
information asymmetries and the number of parties seem to be important considerations 
for future studies in the explanation of civil war outcomes. 
 
                                                          
 
41 David Lake and Donald Rothchild, “Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational 
Conflict,” in The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation, eds. 
David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 12. 
 
42 Barbara Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War,” in Civil Wars, Insecurity, 
and Intervention, eds. Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1999), 42.  
 
43 James Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?” Journal 
of Peace Research 41, no. 3 (2004): 290. 
  
44 Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and 
Commitments to Peace,” International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 127–55. 
 
45 Patrick Regan and Aysegul Aydin, “Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in 
Civil Wars,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 5 (2006): 736–56.  
 




Conflict Basis: Issues and Identity 
 The third major strand of conflict-level negotiation research uses explanations 
rooted in the issue-basis of the conflict.  The overarching explanatory variable in this 
branch is the extent to which conflict stakes are indivisible. An important subset of this 
approach examines such conflicts where identity is the key issue at stake.  
 Scholars have argued that issue indivisibility tends to be a particularly powerful 
problem in intrastate conflict. They suggest that in most civil wars, “neither side can get 
most of what it wants without depriving the other of most of what it wants,” rendering 
negotiation especially challenging.47 If the parties’ goals are so fully incompatible, there 
is little to bargain over, making it unlikely to ever be pursued in the first place.48 A major 
positive feedback loop compounds this, because when issues are such that there is little to 
bargain over, societies are likely to experience zero or failed negotiations and thus further 
civil war. The subsequent events in the fighting tends to push moderates who might have 
driven the conflict towards negotiation into more extreme positions.49 This suggests that 
the indivisibility of stakes in an important explanatory variable when it comes to 
negotiation, and can contribute to meaningful arguments about which conflicts are likely 
to be successfully negotiated.  
 The indivisibility of stakes approach is not without its critics. Some scholars have 
argued that reaching agreements over the issues in a conflict is actually usually not 
                                                          
 
47 Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process, 24. See also Fred 
Ike, Every War Must End (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 95.  
 
48 I. William Zartman, “The Unfinished Agenda,” in Stopping the Killing: How Wars 
End, ed. Robert Licklidier (New York: New York University Press, 1993), 25-26. 
 
49 Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process, 24. 
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exceptionally challenging, even after war has begun.50 Further studies have shown that 
there are many cases where a bargain would have been uncomplicated to strike, were it 
not for the direct costs of the process of pursuing negotiation.51   
 Although technically a type of issue indivisibility, many scholars have studied the 
effects of identity conflict basis on civil war termination processes and outcomes 
separately. Scholars have demonstrated that conflict type is important for duration,52 and 
have made various arguments for why identity has a particularly strong effect. While 
interstate conflicts may also have an identity component, intrastate conflict typically 
involves the fragmentation of multicomponent identities, which can be particularly 
damaging. 53 
 However, in spite of the many arguments for why identity conflicts may be fought 
more with more ferocity and commitment, many have argued that theory suggests it 
much more strongly than the empirical evidence can actually support.54 Some studies 
have found these conflicts are actually slightly more likely to end settlement, and others 
have found that ethnic based conflicts are neither more nor less likely to be resolved 
through settlement.55 While it may be that identity basis is significant in some cases and 
                                                          
 
50 Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars, 2. 
 
51 Jeffery Kaplow, “The Negotiation Calculus: Why Parties to Civil Conflicts Refuse to 
Talk,” International Studies Quarterly 12, no. 17 (2015), accessed February 28, 2016, 
http://isq.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/12/17/isq.sqv005. 
 
52 Fearon, “Why do Some Civil Wars Last so Much Longer than Others?” 275–301. 
 
53 Kissane, “Introduction,” 1-3.  
 
54 Hultquist, “Power Parity and Peace? The Role of Relative Power in Civil War 
Settlement,” 629. 
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not others, a recent review of the literature suggests that based on the multitude of studies 
on this, there is simply no reason to believe identity has any kind of unambiguous effect 
at the conflict level.56 
 
Current State of the Empirical Literature and New Directions 
 The rich literature that has developed from these approaches has provided many 
insights into conflict termination, but is somewhat lacking in consensus about key 
variables and has seen a great deal of mixed results.57 Quality of data seems to be a major 
issue. As many have noted, this literature has a big problem with operationalization of 
concepts that leaves a substantial gap between theory and measurement.58 Furthermore, 
some scholars have highlighted issues with civil war termination data receiving less 
attention and being collected with less precision than other civil war data.59 One major 
issue in that vein has been the coding unclear cases, where data is missing or limited 
enough to complicate even basic selection criteria such as what constitutes a war.60  
                                                          
                                   
55 David Mason and Patrick Fett, “How Wars End: A Rational Choice Approach,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 4 (1996): 546-568.  
 
56 Dixon, “Emerging Consensus: Results from the Second Wave of Statistical Studies on 
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57 Dixon, “Emerging Consensus: Results from the Second Wave of Statistical Studies on 
Conflict Termination,” 121-129. 
 
58 Hultquist, “Power Parity and Peace? The Role of Relative Power in Civil War 
Settlement,” 623. 
 
59 Joachim Kreutz, “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP 
Conflict Termination Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (2010): 243. 
 
60 Joachim Kreutz, “The War That Wasn’t There: Managing Unclear Cases in Conflict 
Data,” Journal of Peace Research 52, no. 1 (2014): 120-124. 
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Another explanation for why the results are so mixed is that the theory in this area is 
somewhat underdeveloped, and that greater specification and refinement of theoretical 
concepts is needed to help clarify the mechanisms at play. 
 One possibility that could account for the contradictory findings is that conflict-
level explanations may need to be supplemented with explanation at another level. The 
ability to research this possibility is increasingly an option as data that are more detailed 
become available. While some literature exists that looks at negotiation from the actor 
level, a gap remains for a study which examines the behavior of nonstate armed groups in 
a broad comparison across known cases using group-level variables.  
 
Filling the Actor-Level Explanation Gap 
 The literature on actor-level explanations of conflict termination patterns remains 
relatively sparse, despite the fact that these explanations could be useful competing or 
complementary explanations to the typically discussed conflict-level theories outlined 
above. Existing literature that explains civil war conflict termination with nonstate 
participants has tended to either focus on actors as spoilers or, with one major exception, 
consists of individual case studies rather than broadly comparative work.  
 The literature on spoilers and related concepts of civil war actors functioning in 
one specific role has existed for a long time. The notion of the spoiler, introduced by 
Stephen Stedman, suggests that conflicts may have certain leaders or parties that “believe 
that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests.”61 
                                                          
 
61 Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” International Security 22, 
no. 2 (1997): 5.  
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This suggests that a major obstacle in the pursuit of peace is finding strategies to control 
such parties.  
 Research that discusses spoilers has been criticized for facilitating a shallow 
understanding of nonstate armed groups and their negotiation behavior. Scholars have 
argued that this literature tends to start with the normative premise of spoiling being a 
bad behavior, and in doing so, lacks a deeper understanding of what goes into the 
behavior it is seeking to explain.62 Other scholars have called for an understanding of 
nonstate armed groups as more than just spoilers, but rather as complex entities that are in 
many cases key to stability.63  
 Some existing work has looked at nonstate armed groups in a more nuanced 
fashion, typically in the form of individual or grouped case studies. Recent case study 
research has examined in depth the decision making processes leading to and occurring 
during the negotiations that ended conflicts such as the civil wars in El Salvador64 and 
Sudan.65 Notable groups of case studies on negotiation have also comparatively examined 
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a few cases from around the world,66 or within a single region.67 These case studies 
provide many useful insights for scholars of conflict termination as they contain detailed 
explanations that elucidate causal mechanisms and limitations of broader theory. 
However, they do not undertake to provide a broader comparative understanding across 
conflicts worldwide.  
 To date, there is one major quantitative study of note which comparatively 
examines negotiation pursuit by insurgent groups in the Middle East and Africa. This 
study tests the effects of conflict level variables on the timing of negotiation pursuit using 
a game theoretic model to describe the distribution of negotiation and find when the peak 
timing of negotiation pursuit is.68 
 A gap in the literature remains for a study that looks at the effects of actor-level 
rather than conflict-level variables in the broadly comparative context of a large-N study. 
The as of yet unaccounted for mixed empirical findings and theoretical insights from 
existing work suggest that this is a fruitful avenue of exploration. This study aims to fill 
that gap using survival analysis to study the length of time different types of nonstate 
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 To facilitate a better understanding of conflict termination, this study aims to 
develop an organizational identity theory of negotiation in intrastate conflict. This theory 
suggests that, while conflict-level variables certainly play an important role in triggering 
the pursuit of negotiation, rebel group characteristics are also important for understanding 
the selection and timing of negotiation pursuit. A nonstate armed group’s framing of its 
struggle, allocation of resources to nonmilitary activities, and acceptance of outside 
assistance are all characteristics which are expected to affect the timing of negotiation 
pursuit. This theoretical section will first establish why an organizational-level theory is 
useful for improving our understanding of negotiation and of nonstate armed groups. It 
will then briefly outline the main components of this theory, discuss its foundational 
assumptions, and delineate the usage of key terms in this study. The next chapter will 
then explore these components more deeply in discussing the hypotheses that can be 
derived from the theory articulated here.  
  
Theoretical Utility 
 An organizational-level theory can help us develop a more nuanced understanding 




might help us examine casual mechanisms that account for the unexplained variation and 
contradictory findings in studies of negotiation and conflict termination. First, this theory 
has the potential to capture some processes that simply do not occur at the conflict level. 
It could also help us develop an understanding of how conflict-system level pressures are 
translated into actions by the real-world actors. Finally, this theory can also aid in 
multilevel explanation, which empirical research suggests is key to adequately 
understanding internal conflict in which casual processes at all levels constantly 
interact.69 
 Theory development at this level is also important for furthering our 
understanding of nonstate armed groups in terms of their behavior, ideas, and unit hetero- 
or homogeneity. Empirical research of nonstate armed group decisions on modes of 
conflict resolution can deepen our knowledge of how these groups function as 
organizations at various stages of the conflict. Examining a broader range of their 
political behavior can also correct for what some suggest has been an excessive scholarly 
focus on military tactics and “the unconventional” at the cost of overlooking other 
dynamics of modern conflict.70 Cooperative behavior by these groups may be, at least in 
part, determined by factors besides conflict structure and it may be possible to uncover 
patterns that hold for various subsets of the nonstate actor category. We may also simply 
be missing important casual processes by using models of conflict termination that 
                                                          
 
69 For a discussion, see: Querine Hanlon, The Three Images of Ethnic War (London: 
Praeger Security International, 2009).   
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assume, for example, that all parties in a nominally “ethnic conflict” are, in fact, all 
fighting for this. There are clear empirical cases that would violate this assumption that 
could be miscategorized in existing analysis.71 
This closer look at the individual organizations can in turn shed light on the 
importance of ideas in these groups and modern warfare more broadly. Some have 
suggested that the ideological justifications in modern wars are often flimsy battlefield 
motivators,72 or in a somewhat stronger formulation, are entirely devoid of meaning, with 
contemporary civil wars being “waged without stakes on either side…wars about nothing 
at all.”73 Other scholars insist that we take participant narratives seriously as a part of 
conflict analysis and avoid the myopia that may come from assuming that unfamiliar 
narratives and the resultant behavioral logics are trivial.74 If organizational 
characteristics, including the way that nonstate armed groups frame and organize their 
struggle are good predictors, this suggests that rebel group ideologies and discourse are 
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worth examining, and for policy practitioners, potentially worth engaging.  
Finally, this theory can help us understand how meaningful a category the 
“nonstate armed group” even is. These groups’ uniting characteristics may be limited to 
exactly the characteristics in the name. Alternatively, these groups may be comparable 
enough that, even with the diversity, distinct patterns of behavior would still emerge. This 
will help guide future scholarship in whether conflict analysis can completely “black 
box” the rebel group as many scholars in International Relations have done for the state, 
should search to find patterns among subtypes, or if these units are so heterogeneous that 
nuances of each units’ characteristics are vital for explanations.  
 
Key Components 
The key components of this theory are threefold. First, despite these organizations 
often being composed of disparate elements, this theory proposes that nonstate armed 
groups still develop an organizational character. It may be very weak and loosely defined, 
however, a core still forms around which the broader group coalesces. This even tiny 
amount of organizational cohesion develops a “character” in the sense that the 
organization formulates at least some minimal amount of agreement about the nature of 
the conflict and the group’s struggle. This organizational character may not penetrate 
down to each individual member, and where it does, would not necessarily do so in a 
unitary fashion. However, the organization as a whole maintains this character and fills it 
with a variety of content including objectives, perceptions, and normative beliefs.  
Second, this theory posits that this organizational character, especially the group’s 
perceptions of what it is fighting for and how the organization it relates to its 
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environment, will affect the group’s behavior in conflict. Rebel groups’ goals may thus 
exceed short term and strictly military objectives. Even groups which seem to have little 
or no ideology will still have some sort of political frame for their military struggle, and 
this self-regarding frame will shape their strategies and decision making. Thus, this 
theory suggests that these groups’ perception, and especially their self-perception, matters 
in their decision-making processes.   
This leads to the third component, which suggests that a group’s organizational 
character will shape its decisions regarding settlement and accelerated conflict 
termination. Conflict system pressures have a powerful effect, but this theory posits that 
these pressures are filtered through the organizational character, which may modify their 
effect. Thus, groups may vary in the extent to which political considerations, including 
feelings of cultural representation, civilian political organization, and ties to outside 
parties, may modify or even transcend what would otherwise be the military-strategic 
calculation of negotiation pursuit.  
  
Assumptions 
This theory makes a number of assumptions about nonstate armed groups and 
conflict termination. The first set of assumptions relates to the nonstate armed group as a 
useful object of study. First, it is assumed that the nonstate armed group can be 
meaningfully treated as a unitary actor, in the sense of acting in an organized fashion, 
having some degree of group cohesion, and making decisions for itself. This does not 
suggest that individual characteristics are unimportant or that the group is homogenous, 
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indeed, these organizations are typically “umbrellas” for a wide array of interests.75 
However, this theory assumes that the organizational level of analysis is still useful due 
to the decision-making capacity of the organization itself, which goes beyond its 
constituent members and leadership.  
Relatedly, it is assumed that these organizations have a relatively stable purpose 
at their inception. While this theory does not bar the possibility of organizational 
evolution, it is assumes that the organization is formed to serve some purpose, and that 
this purpose does not fluctuate suddenly or randomly at conflict outset. 
The third main assumption is that these organizations possess at least a minimal 
degree of rationality in the sense that the organization predominantly acts in accordance 
with a set of preferences. This is not a strict assumption of rationality, and these 
organizations are making choices in information-poor environments with some 
limitations on their information processing. However, some goal and agenda is believed 
to dominate decision-making.  
 
Key Terms 
Defining Civil War 
This paper will adopt the threshold criteria used in the Upsalla/Prio Armed 
Conflict Dataset for defining an armed conflict.76 Per this definition, an armed conflict is 
considered to be occurring in a year when “an incompatibility that concerns government 
                                                          
 
75 John Darby, “Overview of Political Violence,” in The Ashgate Companion to Political 
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28 
 
or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 
battle-related deaths,” and in which at least one party is an internationally recognized 
state.77 Using this smaller casualty threshold has the advantage of limiting the inclusion 
to serious violent disturbances, while avoiding the problem of systematically excluding 
smaller states where the other common threshold of 1,000 battle deaths is far less likely 
to be met.78  
Furthermore, to meet the standard of a civil war for this study, at least one party 
must be the state in which the majority of the fighting has occurred and the primary 
opponent at the initiation of the episode must be internal to this state.79 However, if an 
internal conflict becomes internationalized through another state or states’ intervention, it 
is not removed from the dataset. Intervention is a common occurrence that is not believed 
to fundamentally alter the internal nature of the conflict that exists between the state and 
rebel group. If a broader interstate war transmutes into an internal conflict, the start of the 
civil strife where at least one internal rebel group becomes militarily active is measured 
as the beginning of the conflict episode. Colonial wars of independence are not excluded 
from the definition adopted here, as the imperial power is understood to be the state in its 
colonial territory up to the point at which the colonized state has declared independence 
and is recognized by a simple majority of the international community.  
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The start of the conflict dyad episode is measured with the date of the first battle 
fatality of the conflict episode in which a given rebel group was active. This is used 
rather than the date on which the conflict met the threshold of 25 battle deaths, in order to 
capture early rebel activity. This activity may be relatively low intensity, however, the 
fact that the rebels will have already engaged the government in battle demonstrates that 
the organization has taken clear measures to pursue their goals militarily and has directly 
challenged the state.    
For the survival analysis used in this study, the end date of interest is not 
necessarily the termination of the conflict overall or even the conflict episode. Rather, the 
end date reflects the duration of ongoing fighting without any negotiation or victory. As 
outlined below, the primary risk of interest in this study is initial negotiation pursuit. If 
this occurred, this is coded as the end of the nonnegotiated period of the conflict and this 
episode has experienced the risk of interest, regardless of whether the fighting resumes 
after negotiation pursuit. If either side has defeated the other before the nonstate armed 
group has pursued any negotiation, then this is coded as victory and modelled as a 
competing risk. If the conflict fades below the threshold of 25 battle deaths in a calendar 
year, otherwise stops without a negotiation or victory on either side, or is ongoing at the 
end of the time period studied, this conflict is considered unterminated and is modelled as 
a right censored event in the survival analysis.80 If a new rebel group is formed over the 
course of the conflict, through for example the splintering of an existing group, the 
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beginning of their activity becomes a new conflict dyad episode. Finally, if there is a lull 
of more than 5 years, in which the conflict does not meet the threshold of 25 battle deaths 
but ultimately resumes with the same parties in a dyad, it is always coded as a new 
conflict episode. It is assumed that even if the same parties are at war, such a substantial 
length of time between the fighting has led to sufficient changes in the conflict system 
and composition of the participants to warrant being coded separately.  
  
Defining Nonstate Armed Group 
To be included in this study as a nonstate armed group, the organization must 
meet four criteria. First, the group must have a reasonable degree of coherence, in the 
sense that the group has the logistical ability to act in a unified fashion.81 Second, while 
the leadership structure may be more or less formalized, the organization must have 
leadership that is distinct from other nonstate groups,82 and their organization must be 
acting outside any capacity of a state’s government apparatus.83 Although the distinction 
between state and nonstate actors is becoming increasingly blurred with various 
processes of globalization, this study adopts the standard articulated in others that, while 
there may be intense ties, nonstate groups are those that can be shown to be “in principle, 
autonomous from the structure and machinery of the state.”84 
                                                          
 
81 Peter Thompson, Armed Groups: The 21st Century Threat (Blue Ridge Summit: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 3-4.  
82 Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War 
Duration and Outcome,” 570–597. 
 
83 For example, if officers of the state’s military staged a coup, they would be still be 
considered to be part of a nonstate armed group because they were acting outside of their official 




Finally, to be considered a nonstate armed group, the organizations must have 
used force or the direct threat of force to pursue their objectives. 85  The sample here is 
further restricted to nonstate armed groups which were known to have been active during 
the civil wars studied here and which actively participated in at least some political 
violence. 86 Groups which did not participate in any kind of fighting during the episode 
would not have been expected to participate in negotiation or be victorious or defeated, 
and thus would not make sense to model with groups that did.  
The inclusion of groups had no restrictions based on the size of their membership 
or the degree of formalization. For example, groups which staged a coup were included 
as long as the members acted in a coherent enough fashion to be considered a group, even 
if the participants were only a small handful of military officers and they did not formally 
organize under any given name. 
 
Defining Negotiation and Negotiation Pursuit 
Negotiation is understood to be the pursuit of discussion which is at least 
nominally concerned with at least one of the following: discussing an issue at least one 
conflict party considers to be a cause of the conflict,87 accelerating the timeline of the 
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ending of hostilities, or agreeing to halt the use of violence for any length of time. This 
does not necessarily mean that both parties are there with any intent or to compromise or 
that negotiation pursuit indicates that settlement is their preferred mode of conflict 
resolution.88   
Empirically, the event of interest here is the initial pursuit of negotiation by a 
nonstate armed group in a given conflict episode. In this study, initial negotiation pursuit 
is operationalized as whichever of the following the occurs first: 1) rebel implementation 
of a mutual or rebel-only ceasefire, 2) the attendance of the first day of mediated peace 
talks with at least one representative of the state, 3) the date of signing a formal peace 
treaty with the state as at least one of the parties,89 4) the cessation of hostilities based on 
a peace agreement reached by any other means.90 For the purposes of this study, any of 
the above listed events are considered negotiation pursuit by the nonstate armed group, as 
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long as the organization has participated, regardless of whether it was initiated by them, 
the state, or any third party.  
Although these events vary somewhat in their character, each represents a form of 
pursuing a nonviolent or at least negotiated settlement. Ceasefires are included although 
these may have no deeper discussion beyond a temporary laying down of arms. However, 
the act of implementing a ceasefire when neither party has won establishes a space for 
resolving the conflict by other means even if neither party ultimately follows through 
with doing so. Furthermore, ceasefires also create by implication a broader, albeit 
temporary, settlement of issues such as halting frontlines freezing the spatial distribution 
of controlled territory.91 Attending mediated peace talks is probably the clearest form of 
negotiation, as the groups at least initially agree explicitly to participate and, by 
attending, have their desire for at least an attempt at a nonviolent settlement known 
somewhat publicly. If a group refused to attend formal talks or no mediation was offered, 
the third and fourth forms of negotiation capture a clear willingness to pursue a 
negotiated end to the conflict in the entering of a formal agreement or the implementation 
of an informal one.  
For the purposes of this study, there is no “success” requirement for any of these, 
and indeed, in the majority of the cases studied here, the initial negotiation pursuit did not 
end the conflict in any meaningful way. A ceasefire or mediated peace talks may dissolve 
on the first day. When agreements are signed, these may vary in their depth. Even 
supposedly “comprehensive peace agreements” may skirt the deeper issues of the 
conflict, in effect only negotiating an end to outright fighting and serving as little more 
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than a glorified ceasefire. 92  
Indeed, regardless of how the conflict episode ends, residual violence will often 
plague the supposedly postconflict society for long after the war episode is nominally 
over. 93 This violence may range from a spree of apolitical crimes that arise in the arms-
saturated and disordered society, 94 to what is essentially outright continuation of violence 
with the intent of strategic gain by remnants of the parties,95 what one study has called a 
“war after the war.” 96 In between these, there is also a spectrum of violence that is 
varying degrees of political, such as robberies meant to harass returning refugees or 
sporadic but targeted violence across ethnic lines. 97 The pursuit of negotiation is studied 
not because it is believed to be a desirable form of conflict termination, or because it is 
necessarily a form of conflict termination at all, but rather because the pursuit of 
negotiation is seen as a significant political act regardless of the outcome.  
The time to negotiation pursuit is a useful aspect of this behavior to study for a 
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number of reasons. Duration is well established as an object of study in the literature on 
armed conflict and for good reason. This metric has a number of advantages in the fact 
that it is one of the few which can be measured precisely in a variety of conflict settings, 
and captures useful information every time. It is also a measure of something that would 
likely be extremely important to parties of a conflict, which have other long-term goals 
and experience less uncertainty with a shortened time horizon. Furthermore, as will be 
outlined below, duration is somewhat counterintuitively a better indicator of endurance 
and the extent of fighting than other measures of rebel strength or conflict casualties.  
On the surface, the number of days a conflict has worn on would seem like it is of 
less general interest than the amount of human destruction it has wrought. One might 
furthermore expect the parties to the conflict to be less concerned with the passing of 
time rather than the number of casualties of their own, their opponents, and the general 
population. However, there are a number of reasons for why, even if data problems could 
be overcome, the relationship between casualties and conflict decision making would 
mostly likely be anything but clear or consistent.  
One could reasonably expect that casualties would be likely to act as an 
intervening variable between rebel characteristics and negotiation pursuit. However, the 
theoretical expectations for the effect of casualties on armed conflict diverge widely, so it 
is not necessarily clear what this relationship might be. 98 On the one hand, casualties tend 
to create a positive feedback loop. As grievances accumulate on each side, each party 
increasingly sees itself as victims.99 A logic of retribution pushes them both to increased 
                                                          
  





violence. 100 However, this could either make them more eager to negotiate out of fear, 101 
or it could just make them more eager to keep fighting as each side starts to view their 
actions through the lens of punishment of the other side. 102 Alternatively, high casualty 
conflicts might simply be so draining that neither side has the resources and energy to 
continue, and negotiation becomes almost unavoidable.103 It is likely that these various 
mechanisms might be in play across and even within conflicts at different stages, making 
this a very difficult relationship to study.  
This is further complicated by extremely problematic data availability issues. 
Casualty data are notoriously difficult to collect and verify. Even relatively recent and 
well-documented conflict events may not have clear numbers. For example, even 
estimates from widely accepted sources on the Rwandan Genocide death toll have a 
range of nearly 500,000, in spite of that country’s relatively recent census prior to the 
event. 104 The data on civil war casualties are often so poor that scholars do not risk 
attempting to include it in otherwise relevant datasets.105 Even where numbers are 
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available, major interpretive challenges remain regarding how stringently to set 
requirements for how directly related to the conflict the casualties must be.106 
Furthermore, there is strong reason to believe that perceptions of casualties matter much 
more than magnitude,107 complicating this relationship further. 
Even a closer study of only rebel casualties would likely still not necessarily tell a 
clear story about the endurance of rebel groups or the intensity of the conflict. Rebel 
groups in particular are difficult to study with usual metrics of strength or success. Troop 
size may be irrelevant to their ability to carry out attacks, and groups may be able to 
compensate for an inability to carry out large-scale attacks by using exceptional brutality 
or harnessing the horror of sheer randomness. 108 Furthermore, while people tend to 
imagine that rebel organizations would be cautious with the presumably few recruits they 
can muster and would thus be very resistant to casualties, empirically this has not been 
the case. Forced “recruiting”109 of children allows even smaller groups to fill in their 
ranks under any circumstances, and these children are often considered so expendable 
that they are marched unarmed toward the enemy for the sole purpose of absorbing 
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ammunition.110  While rebel groups are certainly unlikely to be completely indifferent to 
casualties within their ranks, it is doubtful that they have an impact on decision making in 
a linear or predictable categorical fashion.  
Time, on the other hand, is likely to matter with relative consistency across 
conflicts, due to the added risks associated with a longer time horizon. No rebel group or 
state is immune to this. Finally, although the levels may vary, wars are constantly 
creating some degree of human, material, political, and economic destruction across time. 
This cumulative destruction is very troubling, and as many new wars are breaking out, 
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A number of testable arguments can be derived from a theory that treats the 
organizational character of rebel groups as a driver of their conflict behavior. Clearly 
discernable patterns should emerge depending on the traits that dominate these 
organizations’ identity. A cursory examination of contemporary rebel groups shows a 
number of prominent traits which recur in the narratives and activities of these 
organizations, including cultural identity claims, civilian political activities, resource 
extraction, and third-party ties. Gaining a better understanding of groups that possess 
these is an important exercise, regardless of whether this theory ultimately succeeds at 
helping to predict negotiation behavior.  
This chapter will outline four key hypotheses on various subtypes of nonstate 
armed groups by developing an argument related to the nature of a trait and then drawing 
on the existing literature to present theoretical reasons that speak for and against it. Each 
subsection will then conclude with a more detailed description of the operationalization 
of the concept in the empirical section. The next chapter will describe the data and 





Hypothesis 1: Cultural Identity Groups 
 Identity-based conflict has in many ways come to dominate the contemporary 
political consciousness. While there is much debate about the actual role of identity in 
these conflicts, many groups that are framing their struggle in terms of the protection of a 
cultural group have come to the fore. While scholars and analysts may dispute the extent 
to which these groups’ claims are accurate, the fact that a number of active nonstate 
armed groups have distinguished themselves by framing their struggle this way raises an 
interesting question about whether these groups are different. There are plenty of 
compelling reasons why groups which state their struggle as one of advancing or 
protecting a cultural, kinship or religious group would behave differently with regards to 
negotiation pursuit. Because these groups are likely to have an easier time inspiring and 
sustaining rebellion, and a harder time backing down from this position of revolt, we can 
posit Hypothesis 1: Rebel groups which claim the defense or representation of a cultural 
identity group as a key purpose will negotiate later than groups which make no such 
claims.  
 The first major reason to expect earlier negotiation from these groups relates to 
their ability to tap a relatively uncomplicated and sustainable source of group cohesion. 
Claiming to represent a group gives them a relatively uncomplicated narrative to draw on 
to unite their participants.112 It will presumably also give them access the longer origin 
story and powerful symbols of the group they claim to represent. Drawing on existing 
groups gives them the benefit of the dense personal networks, powerful emotions, and 
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patterns of repeated interaction which cultural and kinship groups provide.113 
Empirically, ethnic groups especially have shown an enhanced power to mobilize. 114 
Mobilization around this cause is also likely to be durable, as the grievances commonly 
experienced by cultural groups are likely to increase the group’s solidarity as well as the 
cost tolerance of individual members.115 The ability of these groups to effectively 
organize and build momentum may give them the strength to keep fighting and be 
effective enough that returning to nonviolent attempts to address their grievances, which 
probably failed them in the past, is a far less attractive option.   
 The power of cultural identity may go beyond just an increased ability to build 
and maintain these organizations, to directly affecting the types of activities these 
organizations choose. The concept of defending a broader cultural group may lead these 
organizations to pursue and feel justified in actions that transcend strategic logics of war 
and politics.116 Ethnic groups in particular are likely to have deeper grievances against the 
central government,117 and this feeling may inspire a sense of righteousness in costly 
action that fundamentally shifts the decision-making calculus on continuation of the 
conflict. A feeling of legitimacy and a narrative of representation may not only give these 
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groups the energy to keep fighting, but may also give them a belief not only in their cause 
but also in the righteousness of armed struggle itself.   
 Another powerful motivator for cultural identity-based nonstate armed groups 
especially to keep fighting is their somewhat unique vulnerability to retribution. For 
ethnic and other such groups, fears of broader postconflict punishment are likely to be 
sharpened because cultural makers would make targets easier to identify.118 Furthermore, 
a rebel group which makes claims to representation may give the government enhanced 
justification for broader punishment, making the prospect of giving up the fighting a 
potentially existential question for not just the organization but also a greater swath of the 
population. While losing the struggle is obviously dangerous, laying down arms or 
showing a willingness to do so in the future by agreeing to talks could easily open up the 
broader group to punishment that leaves them in a potentially worse situation than the 
one that inspired the fighting.  
A further reason why identity-based organizations are likely to choose fighting 
over talking is the difficulty of depoliticizing identity once this has occurred. While 
multiethnic societies may not be especially at risk of conflict, once ethnic 
fractionalization has a high salience, these societies do seem to be more at risk of war.119 
Once politics breaks down along ethnic lines, it is generally extremely hard to backtrack. 
The differences which form the basis of these groups are fundamental and inherited, 
making compromise a difficult sell.120 Furthermore, groups which have utilized cultural 
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identity to mobilize are likely to have a harder time credibly committing to negotiation 
due to the inflexibility of their chosen identification.121 The challenge of walking back 
identity politics may keep these groups and their respective states away from the 
negotiation table due to the challenge of selling this strategy to their individual members, 
the broader group, and the other party, or simply due to pessimism about even pursuing it 
in the first place.   
However, although a number of arguments suggest that these groups will pursue 
negotiation later, if at all, there are also a number of reasons why these groups might 
negotiate earlier instead. The first possibility is that these groups will have an increased 
imperative to negotiate sooner from heartfelt or instrumental loyalty to the local 
population. Some such organizations may have legitimate feelings of loyalty to the 
cultural groups they represent, making them experience losses in a way that makes them 
unwilling to see the suffering of the group prolonged with protracted conflict. Even if 
these groups have a high tolerance for casualties, they may also have a harder time 
demonstrating why an extremely long conflict is in the interest of the group they claim to 
represent. Organizations which claim this representation may also face a different kind of 
audience cost if they market themselves as having the interest of the group at heart while 
pursuing conflict over negotiation.  
 Another possibility is that these nonstate armed groups are likely to fight conflicts 
that are more formidable and the fear of losing and retribution will work the other way to 
push them to negotiate. There is some empirical evidence that rebels are less likely to win 
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wars that break down along ethnic lines.122 If these groups are less likely to win, and are 
able to calculate their chances of success with reasonable accuracy, they might choose 
negotiation knowing their high risk of defeat. If these groups fear retribution, it might 
also make sense for them to try to get themselves a favorable deal through peace talks 
and do so relatively early so it is harder for the government to use a long list of crimes to 
deny them. Furthermore, these groups might have a stronger incentive to purse 
negotiation so that they can negotiate for the long-term safety of their group in the 
agreement. In addition to securing favorable terms, negotiating a formal peace agreement 
may involve the international community, whose attention to an ongoing peace process 
may give their representative group further security against government vengeance.  
 There are a number of reasons why testing the effects of cultural identity at the 
organizational level may answer many questions which the conflict level has left unclear. 
Early work would often classify conflicts as ethnic and nonethnic,123 which essentially 
overlooked the existence of nonethnically organized rebel groups in these conflicts. 
Taking a closer look at the groups will get closer to measuring the salience of ethnicity in 
politics, rather than making the mistake of assuming that its presence is significant,124 and 
taking the important step of studying how ethnicity is actually built into politics.125 
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 The concept of cultural identity group representativeness will be operationalized 
as existing in groups that define both themselves and a dominant portion of their cause in 
terms of the cultural representation of one or multiple explicitly articulated cultural 
groups.126 Most of the groups studied here do so in terms of an ethnic group, but 
organizations which represent a religious group are also included. Organizations which 
fight for an ethnonationalist cause are also included, while civic nationalist organizations 
which fight for the goal of a nonethnic based secular state are not. Such groups would not 
be expected to have access to the same mechanisms outlined above.   
 Groups were coded dichotomously for this characteristic, based on whether 
representation was an explicit tenet of their political program. The organization was 
coded according to their representation of their cause, even in cases where scholars have 
argued otherwise. Heavily recruiting from a single ethnicity or cultural group was 
insufficient for positive coding unless they explicitly articulated this as part of their 
strategy and purpose. Furthermore, even if the conflict had largely broken down along 
religious, ethnic, or racial lines, groups were not assumed to be structured this way by 
default or by proclamation of their opponents. Finally, the definition of cultural identity-
based groups was fairly wide. As long as the group had a clear narrative of shared culture 
and either a notion of implied kinship or of shared religion, it was included. Subethnic 
groups that met these criteria, such as tribes or clans, were not excluded.  
 The coding was done dichotomously. No attempt was made to deem the 
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authenticity or extent of the affiliation. Many groups listed this as one of many motives, 
often in a way that would make it extremely challenging to divorce it from their other 
political goals. The purpose was to capture the groups which included this as a major 
objective rather than to make any determination about whether the organization had the 
true interests of the group at heart.  
 A minimum of two sources were used to code each case. These sources were 
typically secondary, but were supplemented with primary sources when possible. A small 
number of cases had to be dropped from the study due to ambiguity about their motives 
and/or a lack of available information. This included the Popular Front for National 
Resistance because almost no information on their political platform was available. 
Another group which had to be excluded was the Union of Resistance Forces in Chad. 
This organization was the only studied group that was such a loose coalition of various 
smaller groups that it was impossible to discern any sort of unifying organizational 
character.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Civilian Political Efforts 
Another notable way in which nonstate armed groups differ from each other is the 
extent to which they engage in nonmilitary political activity. While all the groups studied 
here at least nominally articulate some kind of political goal, some organizations dedicate 
resources to directly organizing this cause by building a political wing into their 
organization. While it is obviously far from unheard of that a military group or individual 
takes over ruling a country after civil war, organizations which have formed a political 
wing before or during the fighting are expected to behave somewhat differently than 
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those which essentially limit themselves to military activity. Such organizations are 
expected to not only potentially see but also be actively working towards a role for 
themselves as a political organization in postwar politics. The undertaking of activities 
that are at least loosely related to the provision of public goods is also expected to change 
the time horizon for these groups, put them in different kind of relationship with the local 
population, and potentially also lead them to recruit and retain a different type of 
participant. These groups are likely to be more ambitious and capable when it comes to 
political organization broadly, and more aware of the costs of pursuing deadly conflict 
resolution strategies among a population they hope to participate in the governance of. 
The formation of a political wing thus leads us to expect these groups to think of 
themselves as a more complex political organization that is likely to be more capable, 
willing, and drawn to negotiation. Thus we can formulate the following Hypothesis 2: 
Rebel groups which have a political wing or established ties to a civilian political 
organization will negotiate earlier than organizations which do not.  
 The first major reason why groups with a political wing or strong ties to an 
existing political organization would be expected to negotiate earlier is due to their 
presumed anticipation of needing some loyalty for a ruling bargain. Even extremely 
repressive authoritarian regimes do not rule by oppression alone.127 Regardless of the 
political system the group envisions, some minimal cooperation from at least part of the 
local population will likely be important to these groups. Pursuing a strategy of endless 
war is unlikely to win the group friends, and thus we would expect these organizations to 
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be sure to express some desire to pursue negotiations, no matter how shallow.  
First, reducing the time of the conflict the local population experiences by 
negotiating is likely to be a popular policy because of the direct costs the population is 
spared. There are also likely to be high audience costs to a rebel group that is seen to be 
drawing out civil conflict longer than absolutely necessary. It is also probable that 
negotiation is a way for these groups to demonstrate their viability as postwar civilian 
politicians by showing competence in nonviolent conflict resolution and rapid problem 
solving. Finally, pursuing negotiation probably would also help these groups to underline 
their legitimacy as political players during the war, making it harder for the central 
government to dismiss them as mere criminals or bandits. Rebel groups with political 
wings are likely to be more sensitive to all three of these advantages due to their 
motivations and the more immediate time frame for their political activities.  
 In addition to the various domestic audience cost logics outlined above, groups 
with a political wing are expected to also negotiate sooner to win the approval of parties 
outside the conflict. Groups which have a political wing are likely to desire a major role 
for their organization within the political process. Whether they seek to control the entire 
state, or seize territory to form their own, they are likely to be seeking some degree of 
legitimacy in the eyes of the outside world. There is clear evidence that rebel groups are 
sensitive to international audience costs,128 and any group which aspires to external 
sovereignty or at least some measure of respect is likely to pursue negotiation earlier to 
make them seem like a reasonable party to the conflict, and avoid looking like they are 
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extending it more than is necessary for personal gain.  
 In addition to the need for domestic and international legitimacy, it is possible that 
nonstate armed groups that have a political wing have somewhat higher levels of 
integrative complexity than those that do not. First, groups that form a political and 
military wing are probably already more predisposed to seeing the conflict issues as more 
complex because they have recognized the need for a multifaceted solution. Such groups 
are likely to further draw in individual members with higher personal integrative 
complexity, as the groups’ nuanced picture of the conflict attracts similarly minded 
people. The differentiation of roles within the organization may also help this, as the 
variety of positions and the different perspectives that come with them can mitigate 
myopia in decision-making. 
Higher integrative complexity is expected to make these groups more likely to 
pursue negotiation than those that view or at least have organized themselves militarily. 
Higher integrative complexity is associated with a complex but generally positive 
relationship with the peaceful resolution for crises at the interstate level,129 and a similar 
effect is expected for nonstate armed groups that have established a political wing.  
 However, it is also perfectly possible that the organizations which form such 
wings are less likely to pursue negotiation on account of their own advanced ambitions or 
the conflicts that they find themselves in. While theory tells us that identity-based 
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conflicts should be harder to resolve than those about other political issues, the findings 
are decidedly mixed.130 It is possible that groups where broader political issues are at 
stake are likely to face especially troublesome conflicts or be fighting for greater political 
change since they saw the need to organize in this way. Furthermore, the groups which 
have the resources to devote to civilian politics may be generally more ambitious, and 
thus also more committed to fighting their cause through to the end. Having the resources 
to delegate to broader functions may be indicative of a broader competence, suggesting 
that they may have a better chance of just winning outright and will thus delay 
negotiation. Furthermore, the fact that they are organizing themselves as a more solid 
political alternative to the status quo may make them less willing to work within any 
confines of the existing system or with existing players, generally both prerequisites to 
negotiation.   
 The civilian political ambitions of these groups is operationalized here to include 
only groups which have established a political wing or set up strong, unambiguous ties to 
an existing civilian political organization. While this has the slight drawback of lumping 
groups that would establish a political wing if they could with those that have no 
interest,131 having some sort of material indicator of the organizational character is 
important for two reasons. The first reason is that many of the proposed causal 
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mechanisms hinge on changes in the behavior resulting from the processes generated by 
the actual activities the group undertakes.  
The second main reason is that there are clear instances of groups, such as the 
Lord’s Resistance Army, the Revolutionary United Front, and the Mai Mai, which 
articulate political goals but make abundantly clear through their actions that they have 
no intent of seizing the state or ruling the territory they control in any meaningful 
political way.132 The extent of the gap between these groups’ nominal political goals and 
the realty of their organization cannot be overstated. While the Lord’s Resistance Army 
puts out manifestos and detailed agendas,133 most experts agree that any political goals 
this organization has exist purely on paper.134 Every group studied here sees themselves 
as important for civilian politics, and articulates some political vision, but the important 
operation here is separating out the groups that actively pursue this during the conflict 
from those that do not. 
This does not suggest that groups without a political wing are totally apolitical. 
Indeed, the political vision of groups may simply be inextricably militarized or otherwise 
extremely outside of the hegemonic political order of today, with one observer noting that 
even rebel groups committed to roaming through the bush “engage in producing an 
alternative world based on narratives of betrayal and exile reinforced the by their 
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existence in such an enclave formation.”135 This is another reason why the more limited 
operationalization here is useful, because it limits the variable to groups with a relatively 
comparable form of political vision and organization in the sense of fitting enough within 
mainstream politics to be recognizable as such.  
Groups are coded as having a political wing if they have a differentiated set of 
roles within the organization for some sort of civilian political agenda or if they have 
established, unambiguous ties to an existing political organization. These roles may be 
filled by military personnel, however the functions of the role must be distinct. This 
variable is coded dichotomously to indicate whether the wing or ties were present during 
the majority of the fighting. There was no judgement made as to the effectiveness of the 
political wing, nor to its size. The data used in this variable were taken directly from the 
coding in “Non-State Actor Data” of Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (v-2013).136  
 
Hypothesis 3: Lootable and Outside Resources 
 A third major factor in the organizational character of a rebel group is based on 
their financing. The funding aspect of rebel organizations and civil war more broadly are 
well established as important factors in the literature on modern conflict. The availability 
of certain funding sources, especially in the form of lootable resources or outside 
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also: Morten Bøås, “Africa’s Young Guerillas: Rebels with a Cause?” Current History: A Journal 
of Contemporary World Affairs 103, no. 673 (2004): 212.  
 
136 David Cunningham, Kristian Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan, “Non-State Actor Data,” 
(2013), accessed May 2, 2016, http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/eacd.html. 
53 
 
assistance, is known to affect rebel conflict decision making and behavior.137 While there 
are some reasons for groups with access to lootable resources or outside support to 
negotiate sooner, theoretical expectations weigh heavily in favor of these organizations 
negotiating later in the conflict. These groups are expected to have an easier time 
organizing a sustained campaign, have multiple incentives to avoid ending the conflict at 
all, and be less concerned with the material and human costs incurred by lengthy fighting. 
Thus, we can formulate the following Hypothesis 3: Rebel groups that receive support 
from an outside party and/or are fighting in a conflict area with lootable resources are 
likely to negotiate later in the conflict than groups that do not.  
 The first major set of reasons why these groups are expected to negotiate later is 
the strengthening effects of these resources on fighting and recruiting. Having access to 
these reliable resources is likely to comparatively extend the abilities of the group due to 
their increased ability to purchase weapons and supplies. Furthermore, it is expected to 
improve their recruitment, as financial gain offers an uncomplicated argument for joining 
the movement,138 and one that is likely to hold out in the face of considerable risk on the 
battlefield, unlike ideas or other intrinsic motivations.139 In addition to this rather direct 
transactional effect on the rebel groups’ strength, there is evidence that resources can 
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magnify the effects of social cleavages, resulting in more conflictual politics.140 This 
magnification, whether related to feelings of relative deprivation or other indirect effects, 
could also make it easier to find and maintain recruits. A group which is thus able to 
mount a powerful challenge to the government and also sustain this is expected to be less 
drawn to the negotiation table.  
 This may build into a second scenario, where the availability of resources for 
extraction gives the war an essentially new purpose of resource accumulation. Personal 
economic gains may be strong enough to motivate these organizations to continue 
fighting or even pursue new conflicts. 141 Even organizations that began fighting with 
political intent may essentially abandon it and pursue the control of territory and 
population with economic rather than political or even military gains in mind.142 In this 
scenario, it is possible that not even victory, but rather continuation of the conflict 
becomes the goal in order to protect and further entrench conflict-based profit 
structures.143 
 This resource accumulation may also introduce another motivation for continuing 
the conflict, beyond pure profit. The high likelihood of illegal activity associated with the 
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profit generating activities nonstate armed groups introduces a new logic of conflict 
extension in the fear of prosecution.144 This is expected to encourage nonstate armed 
groups to keep fighting and avoid any kind of termination, even if the profit motive 
wanes.  
 Finally, a third possibility for why these groups are expected to put off negotiation 
is their diminished concern with audience costs. Domestically, groups with outside or 
lootable resources are likely to be relatively unconcerned with the continuing civilian 
casualties that come with protracted war, because they do not rely on the support of the 
local population.145 Furthermore, the support from a third party during the war suggests 
that the outside party does not categorically object to the rebels’ choice of violent 
political strategy. While continuing to wage war and refusing to negotiate may gain them 
the opprobrium of the wider international community, with one or a few strong 
supporters on the outside, rebels may be unfazed and their supporters unconcerned.  
 Although there are a number of clear causal mechanisms to explain these groups’ 
pursuit of continued conflict, there are some possible reasons why this effect may be 
weak or even go in the opposite direction. First, many scholars have argued that the idea 
of rebellion devolving into a purely economic enterprise is overly simplistic or downright 
inaccurate. Many argue that economic explanations for insurgency tend to be overly 
unidimensional and massively understate the continued political nature of these 
groups.146 Some question the utility of trying to separate out economic motives from the 
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political struggle they are intertwined in,147 suggesting that even in resource rich 
environments, powerful drivers for negotiation may persist.  
 Furthermore, it is possible that the criminal activities and resource accumulation 
might push such organizations to negotiate sooner in an attempt to secure some type of 
amnesty. Many well-known conflict peace agreements, such as the Lomé Agreement, 148  
include clauses that give rebels access to a less punitive form of justice or outright 
immunity from prosecution. Rather than prolonging the conflict, rebel groups who have 
been engaging in looting or using outside resources to wage war may be especially 
interested in negotiating relatively early in the conflict while they have a good amount of 
bargaining power in order to secure legal protection. 
 While earlier studies were forced to measure this at the conflict level, often even 
relying on proxies measures for outside assistance such as whether the Cold War was 
ongoing or not,149 data about outside assistance are now available at the group level. 
Furthermore, thanks to the research of Pävi Lujala, data on lootable resources are much 
more fine-grained, reflecting the availability of lootable resources such as hydrocarbon, 
diamonds, oil, and natural gas reserves not only nationwide, but within the specific area 
of conflict.150 The latter provides a much better sense of whether rebels actually have the 
possibility of seizing the resources, moving the operationalization much closer to the 
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targeted concept.   
 This variable was coded dichotomously to indicate whether or not the group was 
receiving assistance from a third party and/or fighting in an area of the country with 
lootable natural resources. For the former, the coding is taken directly from the 
Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salyehyan “Non-State Actor Data” (v-2013).151 For the 
handful of instances where a group was only strongly suspected of having received 
outside aid from a known party, this was coded as a positive case. It is assumed that if 
there were strong enough suspicions of ties to this group, that there was likely to be either 
an existing relationship, or one which rebels could count on activating in the future if 
they needed it. The data for the lootable resources variable are created from the 
information in a Lujala replication set,152 combing the information he provides on each 
resource and conflict episode into a single dichotomous indicator for each case.  
 While this operationalization has the benefit of studying resource availability far 
more directly than a conflict-level measure would, there are some limitations. As with the 
political wing, some groups may have had a very strong incentive to keep any outside 
sponsorship a secret. Furthermore, with the lootable resource variable, due to the lack of 
available data, there is no way to differentiate between groups which took advantage of 
the lootable resources from those that did not. Even among groups which did take 
advantage of the resources, there was presumably some variation in their effectiveness at 
doing so. However, in his research of armed conflict intensity, Lujala does find that with 
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at least some of the major natural resources, their sheer existence in the region did impact 
conflict intensity, regardless of whether they were extracted or not.153 Thus, it is hoped 
that this particular limitation on the data is not too grave.  
 
Hypothesis 4: External Linkage 
 Organizations which have strong support connections to the outside world may 
also be different for reasons beyond the direct transfer of resources. Having the backing 
of an outside group, even if the actual impacts on group strength are minimal, may serve 
to reduce uncertainty for the rebel groups, thus encouraging them to keep fighting. 
Having at least one partner across the border, plus the probable increased international 
attention which comes with this, is likely to protect the rebels from the risk of a policy of 
total annihilation postconflict. In addition to somewhat reducing risk for the rebels, 
having outside support may also delay negotiation by complicating the situation with the 
addition of another potential veto player, and one that is likely to have a strong grudge 
against the state considering the cost and risk of retaliation incurred by backing a rebel 
movement.154 This possibility of outside connections being important regardless of the 
resources can be tested by seeing if having an outside backer matters even with a 
statistical control for the strength of the rebel group. We can formulate the following 
Hypothesis 4: Rebel groups which receive support from an outside party later negotiate 
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in the conflict than groups which do not.  
 The intervention of a third party on behalf of one or more parties in a civil war is 
an extremely common phenomenon, 155 and one that seems particularly important for the 
conflict’s duration156 and prospects for ultimate termination through settlement. 157  This 
indicates that there is a good chance that outside support will also affect the initial pursuit 
of negotiation, especially by the rebel groups. As these groups are typically smaller and 
more fragile than the state, they will likely be especially sensitive to the reduction in 
uncertainty that comes with outside backing. Even if material support during the war is 
minimal, having this as a possibility may make these groups more confident in continuing 
to fight despite setbacks and uncertainty.  
 The existence of an outside backer to the rebel groups may also delay negotiation 
pursuit due to the addition of a veto player. This can be especially problematic for the 
prospects of peace because it is likely that this third party has a reduced incentive to see 
the conflict negotiated as it is probably not paying much of the direct costs of the ongoing 
war.158 Settlement may be less likely to succeed due to this additional complication, and 
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thus be less likely to be pursued out of cynicism. 159   
 However, there are certainly counterarguments that would suggest that the 
presence of a third party could facilitate earlier negotiation. One straightforward 
possibility is that this party could actually assist the negotiation process by serving or 
helping to secure a mediator.160 There is also the potential for the decreased uncertainty 
the rebel group faces with outside support to push it toward earlier negotiation. Having an 
outsider backer might make the rebel group less worried about the government reneging 
on a peace agreement, thus reducing or avoiding a major commitment problem. This is 
both because the outside party could serve as a guarantor, and in some cases, because 
internationalized conflicts may attract more international attention, putting pressure on 
the state to comply with the agreement. Furthermore, as others have argued, in the pursuit 
of negotiation, nonstate armed groups are likely to be concerned with not only the 
probability of a return to war but also with the relative costs associated with it.161 In 
addition to potentially reducing the probability of the outcome, an outside backer may 
reduce rebel concerns that in the event of the peace deal collapsing, the rebels will pay 
the vast majority of the costs.   
Another possibility is that connections to an outside backer could alternatively 
serve as a type of linkage162 to encourage rebels to negotiate sooner in order to send a 
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positive signal to the rest of the world about themselves, to protect the reputation of their 
partner, or to adhere more closely to the norms their partner follows. Rebel groups do 
seem to be sensitive to issues of reputation, and there is strong evidence that they may 
shift their behavior away from militarily strategic163 but widely condemned practices 
such as child soldiering as a result.164  
The potential theoretical arguments outlined above suggest that it is particularly 
important not only to study whether a third party has gotten involved in the conflict 
generally, but also whether a specific nonstate armed group has been a direct beneficiary. 
Studies of conflict duration overall have shown that military interventions on the side of 
the rebels may lead to faster conflict termination, 165 suggesting that rebel group 
assistance may have a similar effect, especially with regards to negotiation pursuit. Thus, 
the operationalization of third party assistance is based on a binary variable constructed 
from the information in Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (v-2013) that indicates 
whether a group was known or strongly suspected to have received assistance from a 
third party to the conflict.  
For the testing of this hypothesis, a statistical control for rebel strength will be 
introduced into the model. This is meant to test whether the availability of outside 
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support matters for reasons beyond the material facilitation of the rebel movement, which 
is assumed to be captured in the resultant strength of the rebel movement.  
Rebel strength is defined for this study as a nonstate armed group’s ability 
“effectively engage the army militarily and win major battles, posing a credible challenge 
to the state” and the coding is adopted directly from the dataset by Cunningham, 
Gleditsch, and Salehyan (v-2013). It is coded on a five point categorical scale, indicating 
whether the groups are much weaker, weaker, near parity, stronger or much stronger than 
the state. This combined measure has the advantage of considering context and taking 
multiple pathways to success into account, as opposed to relying on a single metric such 
as troop size or territory controlled to indicate the groups’ success.166  
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DATA AND METHOD 
 
Method and Approach 
In order to assess the potential relationship between the variables outlined above 
and the timing of initial negotiation pursuit, a method that models the effects of 
covariates on duration is needed. Survival analysis offers this opportunity by accounting 
for time variant and invariant factors. Modelling at the organizational level allows us to 
study how susceptible or resistant to negotiation various groups are over time.  
However, in the selection of a method, there is a need to consider that there are 
not just the two possibilities that the conflict either ends with negotiation or continues. 
Victory or defeat are an obvious competing risk that these organizations face. Competing 
risks survival analysis can model this phenomenon with these alternatives in mind. This 
offers a clear advantage over other types of survival analysis, which assume that 
censoring, in this case usually nonterminated conflicts continuing past the observed 
period, is independent.167 Assuming that conflicts that continued past the end of the 
analysis are representative of the others in the broader risk set is problematic, as many of 
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these are likely to be unique conflicts that last an abnormally long amount of time.  
The phenomenon studied here fits neatly into competing risks analysis because, 
while some conflicts may ultimately experience negotiation and victory, only one of 
these can come first and there are clear multiple pathways out of the risk set. The 
semiparametric competing risks regression model developed by Jason Fine and Robert 
Gray (1999)168 allows for the modelling of an overall cumulative incidence function that 
corresponds directly with the specific subhazard of the event of interest and is believed to 
be the best choice for meeting all these criteria.  
 
Data and Sources 
 The hypotheses proposed above will be tested using a dataset that builds upon a 
combination of data from existing civil war, nonstate armed group and conflict 
termination datasets with further secondary and primary source research. The set of 
actors examined is taken from Cunningham, Gledisch and Salehyan’s “Non-State Actor 
Data” (v-2013), which contains a list of all nonstate armed groups known to have 
participated in civil wars during 1946-2011. In order to construct the dependent variable 
for each case, information from the UCDP/Prio Armed Conflict Dataset (v.2-2015),169 the 
UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (v.2-2015),170 and the UCDP Peace Agreement 
                                                          
 
168 Jason Fine and Robert Gray, “A Proportional Hazards Model for the Subdistribution 
of a Competing Risk,” Journal of the American Statistical Association 94, no. 446 (1999): 496-
509.  
 
169 Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946-2014,” Journal of 
Peace Research 52, no. 4 (2015): 536-550.  
 
170 Kreutz “How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict 
Termination Dataset," 243-250. 
65 
 
Dataset (v.2-2015) 171  was combined with online archival research in the United Nations 
Peacemaker Peace Agreements Database172 and the occasional use of reference 
sources.173  
 In order to construct the dependent variable of cultural identity representation, 
secondary sources including history books, peer-reviewed journal articles, and 
encyclopedias were consulted. 174 The case notes on the nonstate armed groups in the 
Cunngham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan dataset were also referred to in order to verify 
consistency.175 For the political wing binary variable and outside support for the rebel 
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group, the coding and data were adopted directly from Cunningham, Gleditsch, and 
Salehyan (v-2013). The data on lootable resources was taken from replication data made 
available for Lujala’s article, “The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel 
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Descriptive Statistics and General Trends 
In order to test the hypotheses above, data analysis was conducted with 
information on the actions of the militarily active nonstate armed groups in 565 conflict 
episode dyads between 1946 and 2011.177 As summarized in Table 1, among this 
population of organizations, there was a great deal of variation in their values in the 
independent variables. 
Despite the seeming salience of ethnic conflict during this period, over half of the 
groups studied did not frame their purpose in terms of the protection or interests of a 
subnational cultural kinship or religious identity group. In terms of civilian political 
activities, groups with a political wing or political ties were slightly more common than 
strictly military organizations, but the distribution was still relatively close to even 
between them.  
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Descriptive Statistics for Independent Variables. 
 
 





Cultural Identity Group 
 
                   
Identity Group  271 48.1% 
Nonidentity Group 293 51.9% 
 
Political Wing or Ties  
 
  
Political Wing or Ties 320 56.7% 





Outside Support  255 45.2% 
Lootable Resources 412 73.1% 
Neither  85 15.01% 
  




Just under half of the rebel groups studied were receiving support from a third 
party. A strong majority of groups had access to lootable resources. Only 15% of the 
rebel groups studied were operating without the support of either. 
In terms of their behavior related to negotiation, there was a fair amount of 
variation. Episode duration to negotiation or termination varied from zero to 15,461 days. 
Even extremely lengthy wars did not preclude the pursuit of negotiation, with several 
instances of conflict episodes having fighting that lasted well over 10,000 days before 
any kind of negotiation was pursued. In 263 of 564 of the studied episodes, the rebel 
group did pursue negotiation before any other form of conflict termination was reached.  
 
Competing Risks Survival Analysis Results 
The same data was run through three models, the results of which are summarized 
in Table 2. Model 1, the most basic model, included the binary variables of cultural 
identity representation, political wings or ties, and outside support. Model 2 included the 
same plus a categorical variable representing the relative strength of the rebels. This 
statistical control may help identify how ideas about the purpose of the struggle may have 
an effect on negotiation behavior that goes beyond mere strategic calculation. It could 
also highlight how cultural identification and a political wing that might go beyond 
merely enhancing the rebel group’s ability to materially strengthen their movement. 
Finally, Model 3 zeros in on the effect of the studied variables relative to resource 
accumulation through looting and outside support.178 This can help shed more light on the 
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Competing Risks Regression Results, Models 1-3. 
 
 
Source Information: Data compiled from sources listed in footnote 174, pg. 79. Note: The Wald 













   p>|z| 
 
 
Model 1 (Base Model) 
   
 
 
Cultural Identity    1.352* 0.196 2.080      0.037 
Political Wing   0.852 0.121 0.261      0.261 
Outside Support 
 
   1.400* 0.198 0.017      0.017 
Model 2 (Base Model  
with Control for Rebel 
Strength) 
    
Cultural Identity    1.598* 0.240 3.120     0.002 
Political Wing  0.910 0.132 -0.650     0.518 
Outside Support 
  
   1.390* 0.202 2.270     0.023 
Model 3 (Resources 
Model) 
    
Cultural Identity   1.303 0.187 1.84    0.065 
Political Wing   0.907 0.129 -0.690    0.490 
Resources (Outside  
and/or Lootable) 
 
    0.592* 0.100 -3.10    0.002 
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relative importance of resources in this calculation, and also raises interesting questions 
for further research about the importance of organizational character relative to material 
processes.   
 The first thing the data analysis has made apparent is that no clear conclusion can 
be drawn about the role of a political wing or strong ties to one in the timing of 
negotiation pursuit. While the data here suggest a modest positive effect on the 
propensity for earlier negotiation, unfortunately the test statistic for the estimated 
subhazard ratio is very far from being statistically significant. Thus, no definitive 
conclusion can be drawn about the second hypothesis that nonstate armed groups which 
are organized without a political wing or strong political ties will negotiate later. It is 
possible that there is a relationship that is too nuanced to be captured in this type of 
model, or that the binary data are insufficient for the targeted concept of civilian political 
activity.  
 In contrast to this, a modest amount of evidence is found relating to each of the 
other hypotheses, although not necessarily in confirmation of them. Based on the 
estimated subhazard ratio, nonstate armed groups having a cultural identity 
organizational character is associated with a higher incidence of negotiation pursuit. The 
divergence in these groups’ cumulative incidence functions becomes more pronounced as 
the analysis time is extended, as depicted in the graphed cumulative incidence functions 
in Figure 1.  
There are a number of reasons why these groups might be drawn to earlier 
negotiation. It is possible that their ability to draw on cultural connections to mount a 












Figure 1: Model 2 Cumulative incidence functions for cultural kinship or religious 








However, it is worth noting that the effect size implied by the subhazard ratio is slightly 
increased in the model that controls for rebel strength. This suggests that cultural identity 
representation in rebel groups’ agendas may affect propensity for negotiation regardless 
of the relative strength of the party. It could thus be the case that the indivisibility of 
stakes may work in favor of negotiation. Short of pursuing total genocide or partition, the 
ultimate negotiation of some political coexistence may be the only realistic option for 
these countries and it is possible that both parties to the conflict recognize this, and thus 
do not hold out on talks for as long. Finally, it is worth noting that the statistical 
significance of the effect of cultural identity representation slips just above the 0.05 alpha 
level when the availability of lootable resources are added to the model. This suggests 
that there is a need to better research the potential relationship between resources, 
identity, and movement strength.  
Regarding the fourth hypothesis, the effect of outside support is statistically 
significant in both the model in which rebel strength is controlled for and that in which it 
is not. The estimated subhazard ratio suggests that an organization having a third-party 
supporter is associated with a higher incidence of negotiation, even when rebel strength is 
statistically controlled for. This relationship over time is illustrated in the cumulative 
incidence functions for each group in Figure 2.   
These findings, contra the expectation outlined in the fourth hypothesis, suggest 
that the relationship between outside supporters may facilitate earlier negotiation pursuit. 
The fact that this relationship holds regardless of the relative strength of the rebel group 
suggests the possibility that outside involvement may be important regardless of the 

























these entities which choose to support rebel groups are, in fact, experiencing more 
negative externalities from the conflict than expected based on the analysis in Chapter 4.    
Finally, relatively strong support is found for the possibility articulated in 
Hypothesis 3, that groups with either lootable resources or an outside backer will 
negotiate later. The estimated subhazard ratio in Model 3 suggests that having lootable 
resources in the conflict area or an outside supporter is associated with a diminished 
propensity to negotiate earlier in the conflict. The gap is considerable and holds across 
time, as demonstrated in the cumulative incidence function graph in Figure 3. This is 
somewhat unsurprising, and consistent with the strong findings in a great deal of the 
literature that, while civil wars are not purely economic enterprises, material processes 
and resources are tremendously important for the conflict trajectory.  
This evidence supports the possibility that resource-rich groups are far less likely 
to negotiate. While this does not shed light on whether the economic incentives or the 
resultant political strength of the group is driving later negotiation, it does highlight the 
importance of studying the role of resources not only in war, but in peacemaking as well. 
The results of this model show that while the conflict environment does not seem to wipe 
out the effects of nonmaterial characteristics, it does demonstrate that the resource 
question remains tremendously important, regardless of what type of rebel group is being 
studied. Future research can hopefully shed light on the interplay between ideas and 
























 Figure 3: Model 3 Cumulative incidence functions for groups with outside and/or 
















Significance of Findings 
The findings here suggest that nonstate armed groups vary considerably in their 
organizational characteristics and in their conflict termination behavior. The associations 
found here with cultural identity representation, third party support, and resources 
suggest that they may be shaping patterns in the varied timing of negotiation pursuit. The 
findings further suggest that there is a good chance that organizational character of these 
groups is not extraneous to their decision making, as the associations between 
characteristics hold even with basic statistical controls for material processes. Whether or 
not the narratives the rebels present about their cause and their organizations are 
objectively accurate, this research suggests there is something to be learned in studying 
the self-perception and framing of these groups.  
This has clear implications for future research and potentially also for 
policymakers. It suggests that paying attention to the groups’ message may better help 
others understand their behavior. It also suggests more broadly the continued need for 
research that studies the role of ideas in modern war, particularly when it comes to group 
cohesion and decision making. Finally, it implies that more research is needed to 




related to the conflict situation, versus internal factors and motivators.  
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 While the findings here have illuminated the effects of some important nonstate 
armed group characteristics, there are some important limitations to the project carried 
out here, which hopefully future research may overcome. The first is the fact that this 
model does very little to take the state’s role in the conflict and negotiation pursuit into 
account.179 While the rebel strength measure included in Model 2 is relative, thus 
capturing state strength indirectly, increased military strength of the state does not 
directly increase the state’s ability to win.180 Other factors may be important, not only for 
the military strength of the state in conflict, but in its decision making process more 
broadly. Future research can hopefully study the effects of the state’s characteristics and 
of interplay between the state and rebel traits when it comes to negotiation pursuit. 
 In addition to incorporating the state into the model, future research may 
hopefully help us better understand the role of individual level characteristics in civil war 
negotiation. As one scholar has noted, analyses of modern conflict will often 
underestimate the extent to which civil wars are about “fundamentally personal and local 
(as opposed to national) causes.”181 It is possible that the same is true of not only war 
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making but also the pursuit of peace.  
The effect of individuals can be powerful. A single person’s personality can help 
push a recalcitrant group to the table, for example, with the political credibility and 
personal conviction of William Deng getting a part of the SANU to the negotiating 
table.182 One individual may also massively hinder negotiations, as scholars have argued 
for example about Jonas Savimbi. His “messianic sense of destiny”183 and that he was of 
the “deep conviction that he was fated to rule the whole of Angola” seemed to sustain the 
fighting, while an easy and stable ceasefire was secured almost immediately after his 
death.184 However, it is important to remember that contemporary political violence 
always exists with some group context,185 so an approach which is able to synthesize 
effects at both levels is likely to be fruitful.  
 Finally, hopefully, future research can improve on the project started here by 
utilizing a more nuanced understanding of rebel strength that accounts for the various 
ways in which a rebel group can be powerful and studies the interaction between ideas 
and strength better. Strong rebel groups tend fight shorter wars,186 have the option of 
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pushing the sate into negotiation sooner if they so desire,187 and have better odds of 
reaching a settlement once they do. 188 While there is no doubt that rebel strength matters, 
further research is needed to better understand how the various components of rebel 
strength come together, and how this interacts with their goal-setting and strategic 
pursuits. Future research could ideally account for the various configurations of 
characteristics that build both latent rebel strength and the successful exercise of power. 
Some work looking at battle victories and spatial distribution is starting to do this, 189 and 
hopefully future research with more detailed data can take a similarly nuanced approach 
while also considering nonmaterial factors. Future work may also be able to model the 
interactions of these and other variables with a more sophisticated representation of 
interactions. 190  
 
Conclusions 
 Even when its prospects of success are limited, the decision of parties who have 
taken up arms to pursue negotiation is an intriguing behavior. It is easy to be cynical 
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about negotiation processes. However, while victory may be more stable in the short 
term, a longer time horizon can reveal many unseen benefits in terms of better 
governance, reduced inequality, and otherwise diminished reentrenchment of the warpath 
in a nation’s political landscape.191  
 Our understanding of contemporary war and peace is also incomplete without a 
nuanced understanding of the nonstate armed group. The organizational character of 
these groups vary greatly, and research is needed to study the significance or lack thereof 
of their various characteristics when it comes to the decision-making calculus of conflict 
termination.  
 The study here has made a modest contribution to this with the development of an 
organizational character theory of nonstate armed groups and empirical research 
indicating the importance of cultural identity group identification and outside support to 
these groups’ propensity to pursue negotiation earlier in the conflict. That these 
relationships hold regardless of the military strength of the rebel group suggests a 
complex causal process that may transcend material factors may exist. Based on the 
findings here, these groups also seem to face a countervailing pressure away from early 
negotiation that results from lootable resources and outside support. Future research 
should help the academic community better understand the complex relationship between 
resources, identity strength, and community support.  
 While future research with more refined data can hopefully solidify our 
understanding of these relationships, the research here does indicate that nonstate armed 
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groups are far from a homogenous set of entities, and that some patterns do emerge when 
studying them. A better theoretical and empirical understanding of organizational 
character will hopefully deepen our understanding of these groups’ behavior in the highly 
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